THE GUATEMALAN AFFAIR: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR.

University of Michigan

I

Latin views toward the United States are not merely those of the weak toward the strong. They are, by the Latins’ own definition, those of the poor toward the rich, the cultured toward the uncultured, the idealist toward the pragmatist.1 They are those of a people largely inexperienced and misled in the political arena, and without practical criteria for the Anglo-Saxon notion of “democracy,” either political or cultural. But they are bitterly experienced in the ways of dictatorship, economic exploitation, and grinding poverty. Born in Iberian feudalism and Catholic fervor, the Latin plainly does not understand the largely Protestant, industrialized, politically and culturally democratic, radical (and yet conservative) United States.2 It is certainly a slight exaggeration to say that the most important thing the two groups have in common is the hemisphere in which, by geographic accident, they live.3

To them we are Yanquis, past and present exploiters, rich because they are poor, slightly drunk with our new postwar power, and verging toward fanaticism in our anti-communism. But their principal current complaint against us is our overflowing generosity toward Europe and Asia and our niggardliness toward themselves. A rather common postwar joke among underdeveloped nations seems to acquire new meaning when applied to Latin America: a presidential adviser, gloomily surveying our massive aid to Germany and Japan, suggests war on the United States, because we are so generous to those we defeat.4

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1 This view of the United States is common, not only among Latin Americans, but among nearly all underdeveloped nations. The leaders of India, for example, argue that while the United States may be rich and powerful, India has far greater spiritual values which may be glimpsed only faintly by Americans. The best expression of the corresponding Latin American view is frequently said to be found in the famed and quite powerful work Ariel, written by the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó, in 1900. For a short synthesis of the Indian view, see F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations (New York, 1952), Chs. 3, 4, and 6.


3 The contrary view, although presented without significant documentation, is stated by former Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza Lasso in his little book Problems of Democracy in Latin America (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1955), pp. 2–3.

4 The rejoinder of the adviser’s chieft is not necessarily apropos; after agreeing that this might hold possibilities, he objects, “Suppose we won?”

The disparity of United States economic aid to the various areas is striking when

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Guatemala, in its backwardness, general maldistribution of power and wealth, and syncretistic culture and religion, nearly epitomized those nations which sprang from the imposition of the Spanish yoke on a relatively well-populated Indian nation. Independent of external political control in 1823, Guatemala was a member of the United Provinces of Central America until 1838. Caudillo followed caudillo in the presidency, some enlightened but most despotic, some sympathetic to the Catholic Church, some anti-clerical. As in much of Latin America, “elections” were held only when the government felt sure it could win, so revolutions became the more popular way to change governments. The last completely typical caudillo was General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, who came to power in 1930 and maintained himself until an almost fantastically courageous university student-led strike forced his resignation in July, 1944. A brief but uncertain interim government, taking his orders, was ousted by a real military uprising in October, and in a subsequent election, Juan José Arévalo was elected for the 1945–1951 presidential term.

There is little doubt that communism got its start in Guatemala under Arévalo; Arévalo’s successor, Lt. Col. Arbenz, who served from March, 1951, until his ouster in July, 1954, was quite sympathetic to Communist activities, but under the best of contrary circumstances the ouster of Communists from their positions in the government would have been extremely difficult and would have stripped the government of its trained, though not necessarily efficient, bureaucrats. Criticism of the character of the government, centering

viewed statistically. Seymour Harris, in “How Good is our Good Neighbor Policy?,” *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 28, 1954, pp. 17 ff., says that “of about $80,000,000,000 of United States Government foreign aid since 1940, the people to the south of us have received but 1 to 2 per cent.” The point is supported by the Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America to the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, *House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session* . . . (Washington, 1954), p. 18: “ . . . the fact remains that to this critical area we have devoted less than 1 percent of the billions of dollars of grants that we have appropriated . . . to help friendly nations . . .”

Tom Fitzgibbons, in his article “An Empty Briefcase at Rio,” *The New Republic*, Vol. 131, pp. 12–15 (Dec. 13, 1954), states even more dramatically: “Since the war, the United States has given, outright, to wealthy Belgium and tiny Luxembourg three times more than to all 20 Latin American nations.”


7 James, pp. 46–52, 70 ff., cites a few of the Communists who held important positions in the government. The late John E. Peurifoy, who was United States Ambassador to Guatemala from October 3, 1953 to September 15, 1954, told a House of Representatives committee investigating Communist aggression in Latin America that his conversations with Arbenz had convinced him that the man was a Communist. *Ninth Interim Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, 1954), pp. 124–26 (hereinafter cited as *Hearings*).
in the United States, developed during this period. A series of five articles by Fitzhugh Turner of the *New York Herald Tribune* in February, 1950, was illustrative of the nature of this comment.  

Among the exiles forced from Guatemala by the operations of the Arévalo-Arbenz government was Lt. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had been condemned to death for his implication in an unsuccessful attempt against the government in late 1950. Castillo had escaped in June, 1951, and had established himself in neighboring Honduras. By the end of May, 1954, he was openly active in the preparation of a force designed to invade Guatemala and overthrow its government. The Honduran government seems not to have undertaken to fulfill the customary obligation of nations in international law to prevent one's territory from being employed as a base of operations against a state with which diplomatic relations are currently maintained. On the other hand, the Guatemalan government had not been overly-correct in its relations with Honduras. A general strike had gradually developed in Honduras between February and May, 1954, in a situation in which there had never before been organized unions or even significant labor leadership. At one time 44,000 workers were absent from work, and substantial damage resulted from untended crops and some vandalism. Ambassador Peurifoy later testified that probably at least $750,000 entered the country as aid to the strikers from Guatemala. It is quite likely that Honduras' hospitality to Castillo Armas was a means of redressing the record against Guatemalan intervention.

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The *New York Times*, June 18, 1954, reported: "Foreign correspondents in the Honduran capital were impressed by the numbers of khaki-clad men in the city and gathered at the airport. Wearing no insignia, the men boarded planes without any apparent effort to hide their movements." Honduran failure to check such an obvious gathering of forces can lead only to the conclusion that that nation was in fact performing an act of aggression against Guatemala. Failure of joint inter-American action to develop under the circumstances was further an ignoring of the meaning of article 24 of the O.A.S. Charter, which states that "Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States," and of the resultant article 25: "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory . . . of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression . . ., the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject."

10 *Hearings* (cited in note 7), pp. 119-20. See also the *New York Times* for this period.
II

The Tenth Inter-American Conference met at Caracas, Venezuela in March, 1954.11 The United States had previously expressed its desire to have the conference record itself as being anti-Communist. Such a policy declaration had been elicited from the Ninth Conference in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948,12 but in view of the increased Communist power in Guatemala it was felt desirable to reassert the compact that communism was unwelcome in this hemisphere. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles led the United States delegation during the opening phases of the Conference, addressed its plenum several times, and was rewarded by the passage of his resolution:

... The ... Conference ... Declares: That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, ... and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.13

The “existing treaty” referred to is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, written in 1947 at the Quitandinha, Brazil, Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics (often referred to as the “Treaty of Rio de Janeiro”). Article 6 of that treaty, referring to acts of aggression which are not armed attacks, seems most appropriate to the Caracas anti-Communist resolution. This article authorizes a meeting of the Organ of Consultation (the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics meeting in special session) for the determination of “measures which should be taken for the common defense....”14 The Rio Treaty and the Bogotá Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948 are in turn linked; article 19 of that Charter states: “Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the princi-

11 These quinquennial Inter-American Conferences are declared to be “the supreme organ of the Organization of American States,” by article 33 of the Charter.
ples set forth in articles 15 and 17." It therefore follows that sanctions taken under the Caracas anti-Communist resolution cannot be construed as violative of the provisions of the Charter of Bogotá which state the principles of territor-orial and political integrity of the signatory states.

It is significant that those who sprang to Dulles' support in the debates following the presentation of the resolution were not the democratic nations but the authoritarians, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru. Guatemala's Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, denouncing the Dulles proposal as "... the internationalization of McCarthyism, the burning of books, and the imposition of stereotyped thought," received twice the ovation that Dulles did. The New York Times reporter Sydney Gruson later put it succinctly:

Senor Toriello had said many nasty things about the United States that virtually all Latin Americans believe. They were willing to applaud him since it cost them nothing. But not many were willing to vote against the United States when they might have to get up later in the conference and ask for economic aid. In the committee vote, only Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina sided with Guatemala.

After the final vote Uruguay, frequently a Latin bellwether, said through its delegate: "We contributed our approval without enthusiasm, without optimism, without joy, and without the feeling that we were contributing to a constructive measure.

Having obtained a conclusive 17–1 vote in committee, Mr. Dulles returned to Washington on March 14, 1954. The conference was to run for two weeks longer and, from the Latin viewpoint, had only just gotten to work. The Latins are not unaware of the threat to their security implied by international com-

15 Ibid., p. 371.
17 Ibid., March 6, 1954. For the text of Toriello's speech see O.A.S., Tenth Inter-
American Conference, Document 96 (English), SP-23, 5 March 1954. Toriello's argument against the United States as an interventionist nation and destroyer of Guatemalan democracy is elaborated in his La Batalla de Guatemala (México, 1955). Toriello here (pp. 65–66) develops his thesis that the Arbenz government was doomed from the moment of the triumph of the Republican party in the 1952 United States presidential elections, by virtue of the fact that Dulles is both stockholder and long-time corporation counsel for the United Fruit Company, and legal adviser to the company in the drawing up of the contracts of 1930 and 1936 with the Ubico government.
18 New York Times, March 7, 1954. The Latin American view that their votes repre-
sented a quid pro quo for securing a hearing for their views regarding United States' economic policy can scarcely be avoided from a literal reading of this quote. Such an interpretation is not far from the truth.
19 Ibid., March 16, 1954. Guatemala voted against the proposal, Mexico and Argent-
tina abstained. Costa Rica did not attend the conference in protest against the govern-
ment of Venezuela.
cuss, and Mr. Dulles' proposal received their support because the present United States administration has made it reasonably clear that only nations which take approved views of international communism can expect to be recipients of economic aid or technical assistance without much American grumbling. This assistance is of course vital in view of the inability of the private sector of the United States economy to supply sufficient developmental capital to Latin America to meet that area's needs. Further, in view of their support of his proposition, Mr. Dulles' departure was, in their eyes, tantamount to his saying that he was concerned only with that support, and could not take time to discuss Latin American internal problems since they were not sufficiently important. Mr. Dulles attended one meeting of an economic subcommittee of the Conference, but his discussion there, while frank, indicated that the United States was unprepared to discuss meaningfully Latin America's economic preoccupations. This inability of the two sectors of the hemisphere to agree even on the nature and scope of the problems confronting them seems characteristic of inter-American relations. The post-World War II period seems merely to have witnessed a heightening of the lack of mutual understanding.

III

From the viewpoint of the United States, the Caracas meeting's principal significance, therefore, was that it gave us the firmer anti-Communist statement desired from the Latin American nations. Guatemala was not specified in the statement, but it was obvious that it was directed against that nation. Sydney Gruson pointed out the atmosphere of the Conference:

One of the by-products of the political committee's debate [on the resolution], many delegates believe, is the tying of the United States' hands so far as the situation in Guatemala is concerned. The United States has publicly expressed its alarm over the growing influence of Guatemalan Communists on the Government of that country. For some time much of Latin America has been expecting unilateral U. S. action in regard to Guatemala.

But Secretary Dulles repeatedly assured the delegates that his resolution was not aimed at any American country and that the United States was solely concerned with intervention of international communism in this hemisphere. Much of the support given the United States' resolution was given on this understanding, and there would be deeply felt unhappiness in Latin America if, having passed, the resolution were to be turned into a weapon against Guatemala.29

29 New York Times, "Review of the Week" section, March 14, 1954. For many years the Latin American nations tried to achieve United States acceptance of the principle that no nation should intervene in the domestic or international affairs of another. Specific efforts were made at the 1928, 1933, 1936, and 1947 meetings of the American nations. At the 1936 (Buenos Aires) meeting the Special Protocol Relative to Nonintervention was signed by the United States and later ratified. Article 1 of this protocol states in part: "The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties. . . ." Bemis, op. cit., pp. 227-89. Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter probably states the ultimate degree of this principle: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. . . ."
But the declaration was to serve by implication almost immediately as if it were indicative of moral support for United States action inimical to the Arbenz government in Guatemala. The impression that the Caracas resolution might be used against Guatemala was heightened by consultation visits to Washington by the United States' ambassadors to four of the Central American nations. One of them, who was not identified, was reported by Paul P. Kennedy to have told that writer: "Well, we put through our resolution in Caracas, and now we have got to decide what we're going to do about it."21

On October 3, 1953, John E. Peurifoy had been appointed United States Ambassador to Guatemala. He had already established a reputation as one of the United States' more accomplished anti-Communist diplomats by his activity in Greece. It seems clear from the circumstantial evidence presented by journalists concerning the period from his arrival to the outbreak of the civil war between Castillo Armas and the Arbenz government that the United States did little to disabuse Arbenz' opponents of the notion that North American aid, moral and/or military, would not be lacking when the need arose. But it is difficult to find evidence which would clearly implicate Peurifoy or other United States' representatives in the plotting which resulted in Castillo's invasion from Honduras.22

Events in Guatemala leading to the civil war seem to have commenced with the State Department announcement on May 17, 1954, that a shipment of arms totalling 1,900 tons had arrived at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. The arms shipment originated in Czechoslovakia, but reached Guatemala by a chartered Swedish ship whose charterer disclaimed any knowledge of the use to which

This hard-won principle was, in the eyes of the Latins, endangered by the anti-Communist resolution, as was another article of the O.A.S. Charter, number 13: "Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. . . ."

21 See Kennedy’s article in the “News of the Week” section of the New York Times, May 23, 1954.

22 The lack of publicly-available proof has been noted by many writers. Donald Grant of the St. Louis Post Dispatch writes: "... this writer is not in a position to assign precise roles for the events which culminated in the fall of the Arbenz government, although he was, in fact, an eyewitness to many of the decisive events. Exiled Guatemalans, the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, the United States Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States National Security Council and other agencies and individuals were involved." "Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 69 (1955).

Flora Lewis, writing for the New York Times Magazine, July 18, 1954, p. 9, says of Peurifoy: "It was perfectly clear that his instructions and his purpose had one simple theme: 'Get rid of the Reds'." In testimony before a special House of Representatives committee investigating Communist aggression in Latin America, Peurifoy denied this charge, however: "... I would like to take this opportunity to explode a popular and flattering myth regarding the part I played in the revolution led by Colonel Castillo [Armas]. My role ... was strictly that of a diplomatic observer. ... The first and only active role that I played ... was to lend my good offices to assist in negotiating the truce between the forces of Colonel Castillo and the military junta that was established in Guatemala after President Arbenz resigned. ..." Hearings (cited in note 7), p. 114.
the ship was put.22 News stories concerning both content and purpose conjectured unrestrainedly, but the full truth of the shipment probably will never be known. On the one hand, the New York Times writer Sydney Gruson reported from Guatemala City at the time of the shipment's arrival in May that the evidence seemed to indicate that the arms would be almost entirely for the army, and only in slight measure for rural or worker's militia or subversion in neighboring nations.24 On the other hand, materials written later could not conflict more directly with this version.26 The contents themselves are the object of equal uncertainty. While Gruson in July wrote that the bulk of the shipment was obsolete, including a great deal of materiel that can only be classed as "white elephants" by any standards relative to the Guatemalan situation, other versions argued that the arms were modern in the extreme and deadly under any circumstances.28 The reader seems free to accept the version of his choice. The strength of the State Department version seems heightened by the fact that the ship in question, the M/S Alfhem, was known to have been involved in the carrying of newly-manufactured arms from the Skoda Czechoslovakian plant. It had been loading them at the Polish port of Stettin and taking them to other Communist ports throughout the world for some time preceding this incident.27 The cloak-and-dagger atmosphere of the affair was also heightened by Secretary of State Dulles' statement that the Alfhem had cleared

22 Reuters dispatch in the Christian Science Monitor, May 22, 1954. The New York Times, May 23, indicates the material was shipped in cases marked "hardware, auto parts, iron rods, optical glass, etc."

24 New York Times, May 24, 1954. It is ironic to note that Gruson reported in this dispatch that the outcry of the United States against the arms shipment (it had been the United States which had first released the news of the event to the world) had produced a solidarity of Guatemalan opinion behind the government that had been surprising even to government leaders themselves!

The day previous, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello had announced to the diplomatic corps at Guatemala City that his nation rejected the protest and action of the United States as "aggression," and that it was considering seriously a plea to the United Nations Security Council under article 35 of the Charter.

25 See, for example, "Guatemala: What the Reds Left Behind," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 211, pp. 60-65 (July, 1955), by a free-lance writer, Keith Monroe. Monroe's version was substantiated to this writer by a confidential source in Mexico in the summer of 1955.

26 Gruson's version is found in the New York Times, July 9, 1954. Gruson states that the bulk of the shipment was of World War II or earlier vintage, and that much of it was anti-tank mines and very heavy German artillery built to travel on the autobahns of Hitler's construction. Other equipment, he states, included nonfunctioning Czech, British, and German rifles, and a few useful Czech machine guns. Gruson tells the story that the army spent much of its time after the outbreak of fighting trucking the mines, which had been stored in the army headquarters in the heart of Guatemala City, out of town to prevent a catastrophe from a lucky bomb hit. This version has definite comic-opera overtones.

The contrary version, that much of the shipment was highly modern, is supported by Monroe, op. cit., and the press statement by United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on May 25. In the questioning after the presentation of the statement, Dulles even conjectured that the arms might well be intended to develop a Communist strong point dominating the Panama Canal! See New York Times, May 26, 1954.

first for Dakar, French West Africa, and that it had been unloaded at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, "under conditions of extraordinary secrecy and in the personal presence of the Minister of Defense."

Sydney Gruson's version in the *New York Times* could only lead to the conclusion that the Communist leaders of Guatemala had been made fools of by their own Soviet superiors; it should be added that this is not impossible, granted the apparent manner in which Soviet leaders regard Communist leaders outside of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the parallel between the shipments to Guatemala in 1954 and those to Egypt in early 1956 is inescapable.

The United States employed the shipment to arouse sympathy for its subsequent anti-Arbenz actions. It was also employed as the basis for a nearly unprecedented request to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that they grant the United States the privilege of searching their merchant ships on the high seas for arms shipments to Guatemala. The request was rejected by all of the nations to which requests were made.

On May 20, the United States concluded a Mutual Security Treaty with Honduras (a similar treaty had been signed with Nicaragua on April 23), and on May 24 it was announced that the United States Air Force was airlifting war materiel to the two nations. On May 25, United States Representative Patrick J. Hillings of California repeated to the House the Dulles charge that "the arms [imported by Guatemala] apparently were to be used to sabotage the Panama Canal." On May 26, the United States searched the French merchant ship *Wyoming* at the Panama Canal, finding cases of Browning automatic rifles not carried on the ship's manifest. On the 27th, three B-36 bombers paid a "courtesy call" on Managua, the Nicaraguan capital.

Nicaragua had broken diplomatic relations with Guatemala on May 19, and undertook immediately to discuss the Guatemalan situation with the other American republics, with the intention of seeking a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the members of the O.A.S. as an Organ of Consultation. In spite of its obvious concern, the United States indicated it would not try, at that time, to call for such a meeting, but rather would let the Nicaraguan action mature. But on June 7 the *New York Times* reported that the United States had initiated informal talks for the same purpose, under the terms of articles 39 and 40 of the O.A.S. Charter.

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29 See Covey T. Oliver, "International Relations and International Law; Some Problems of Inter-Relationship," a paper read at the 50th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9–11, 1954, pp. 7–9. Also, *New York Times*, June 19, 1954. The rumor, previously reported on May 25, that two additional shiploads of arms had departed for Guatemala, undoubtedly was instrumental in causing the United States request.


31 The *Wyoming* carried several cases of sporting guns and ammunition, but these had been indicated in the manifests. The Browning automatic rifles, consigned to a private address in El Salvador, had not been so listed. Evidence indicated that the falsification had been performed by some private person, not by the French Line, which operated the ship. *New York Times*, May 27 and 28, 1954.
It had been assumed generally that the United States, having by this time received informal support from a majority of the O.A.S. members for such a convocation, would propose formally that this meeting be called at the regular meeting of the O.A.S. Council on June 16. This was not done, although such a call would have made it more possible for the O.A.S. to take immediate action at the highest level when the fighting in Guatemala actually broke out on June 19.22 United States failure to act is regrettably. Clear information concerning the facts of the situation could have been discerned more easily at that time than later, and it certainly would have given satisfaction to the entire hemisphere that the United States wanted the facts to be known.

Tension mounted within Guatemala. An effort was made to blow up a part of the railroad line to the capital from Puerto Barrios23 and an unidentified airplane spread anti-government leaflets on Guatemala City. Secret police activity, including arrests, tortures, and murders, stepped up markedly.24 Spo-

22 It had been expected that the meeting would be set for either June 28 or July 1 at Montevideo. Under Article 40 of the Charter of Bogotá, support of the United States proposal by an absolute majority of the O.A.S. Council would have resulted in the convocation of the meeting.

It is significant that steady United States pressure had apparently gained the acceptance of the proposal by a majority of O.A.S. members, including Mexico. The State Department's approach was designed to show that the acts of Guatemala had been a threat to the security of her immediate neighbors, and the relative success of the effort showed that the view was taken seriously. State Department spokesmen, including Mr. Dulles, noted that the Guatemalan attitude was persistently that the only real issue was that government's treatment of the United Fruit and other private interests. Accordingly, Guatemala had proposed as early as May 23 that Presidents Eisenhower and Arbenz personally discuss the matter in an effort to improve relations between the two nations. In his press conference of June 8, Mr. Dulles declared in part, "[this] is a totally false presentation of the situation. There is a problem in Guatemala which affects the other American states just as much as it does the United States, and it is not a problem which the United States regards as exclusively a United States-Guatemala problem." New York Times, June 9, 1954.

23 The confidential source cited in note 25 stated that this destruction was actually an effort by part of the Guatemalan army to prevent the arrival of the arms at a point where they could be distributed to peasant militia units organized for the defense of the Arbenz government and to potential saboteurs in Honduras.

24 Ambassador Peurifoy, testifying before the special House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America, said in part: "No case of Soviet direction was more clear than what occurred after the return of [José Manuel] Fortuny [Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Guatemala] last January. A press and propaganda campaign, stirring alarm over resistance of anti-Communists to the Arbenz regime, was immediately cranked up in the endeavor to prepare public opinion for the blow to fall. Then, at the end of January, 1954, the dramatic announcement was made of the uncovering of a subversive 'plot,' with the sinister note of foreign intervention, linking the United States by innuendo as 'the country of the North' from which direction and aid was allegedly being furnished the 'plotters.' This set the stage for wholesale arrests of anti-Communist citizens and for subsequent imprisonment, torture, and even murder. Many who were later released, beaten and broken, were pushed across the frontiers into México and Honduras by the vicious truncheon-wielding police. . . . Your committee is well aware that these tactics of brutal suppression and terrorization of the opposition is characteristically the last blow of communism in a country outside of the Soviet Union before complete seizure of power." Hearings, p. 117.
radic outbursts of violence in opposition to government police and troops occurred in outlying settlements, and the departure by air of Arbenz' mother and children on June 15 indicated the real seriousness of the situation.

Col. Castillo Armas' troops entered Guatemalan territory from Honduras on June 19. A period of somewhat desultory fighting followed. Arbenz resigned on June 27 after an all-day conference with his military leaders, and the Army Chief of Staff, Col. Enrique Díaz, established a short-lived provisional government composed of three officers. One of these, Colonel Elfergo Monzón, replaced Díaz on the 29th, after the direct intervention of Ambassador Peurifoy. Peurifoy and a Marine bodyguard, both armed, were present in the conference room at the time power changed hands.

Monzón and Castillo Armas met in San Salvador, the capital of the neighboring nation of El Salvador, on June 30, under the good offices of Salvadoran President Oscar Osorio. Initial talks seemed inconclusive, and Peurifoy was notified that his presence would be desirable. He had been holding himself in readiness in Guatemala City, and flew immediately to San Salvador. He was quoted as saying, as he debarked from his plane at the airport, "We will get this straightened out." Monzón and Castillo Armas reached an accommodation on July 2. A June 30 Christian Science Monitor dispatch headed "Red Guatemala Rout Ups U. S. Obligations" seemed to epitomize the intimate role the United States had played in the change of governments, while Milton Bracker of the New York Times wrote in that paper's July 3 issue: "The signing [of the Monzón-Castillo Armas agreement] represented an unmistakable victory for United States policy, and particularly for ... Peurifoy, ... who had taken an essential, difficult role in bringing it about." 35

The conclusion that the United States played an important part in the struggle in Guatemala seems inescapable. It cannot be shown that any of the arms airlifted to Honduras or Nicaragua ultimately appeared in the hands of the Castillo Armas forces. Rather, news reports indicate that the Castillo troops were armed with a hodge-podge of weapons, including even a few muzzle-loading rifles. Jeeps, DC-3, and P-47 aircraft were used by Castillo’s men, but the ubiquity of such materiel, ten years after the Second World War, is virtually axiomatic. In fact, the military strength of Castillo was largely symbolic, and casualties and combats were few. The decision of the Guatemalan army not to seek battle with Castillo was really what toppled Arbenz. 36 But it can be shown that the United States played a role in the United Nations which tended to deny to Guatemala the privileges apparently guaranteed it by its membership in that organization. At the same time vacillatory Guatemalan action made it difficult for the U.N. and the O.A.S. to do anything significant to prevent the success of the Castillo movement.


36 See Life, July 12 and July 19, 1954, for illustrations indicative of the arms used in the fighting.
IV

In response to the urgent request of the Guatemalan representative on June 19, the U.N. Security Council met on the call of its president, United States representative Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 20. Guatemalan representative Eduardo Castillo-Arriola asked immediate U.N. investigation of his charge that the fighting had begun with the invasion of his country by forces stationed in Honduras and Nicaragua and backed by "foreign monopolies" with the knowledge of the United States State Department. The two accused nations denied this, and a draft resolution was presented by Brazil and Colombia. The draft pointed to the availability of machinery under the O.A.S. for the possible settlement of the problem, provided that the Security Council would refer the problem to this machinery, and asked for immediate O.A.S. action to bring bloodshed to an end. The vote on the resolution was 10–1, the Soviet representative vetoing. An innocuous French-offered resolution calling for a termination of bloodshed was then adopted, ending five hours of occasionally bitter debate.

The Brazilian delegate remarked that the Soviet veto did not prevent the O.A.S. from taking action in the matter. But the Security Council took no ac-

38 U.N., Document S/3236, June 20, 1954. Sr. Castillo-Arriola's statements obviously referred to the private United States enterprises in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company being not only the best known but the favorite target of the Arbenz regime and its spokesmen. This attitude is explained in greater detail in Torriello, op. cit.

It seems unnecessary to belabor the role of the Fruit Company in the Caribbean area, since this has been done virtually ad nauseam in a number of excellent and well-documented books. See particularly Charles David Kepner, Jr., and Jay Henry Soothill, The Banana Empire (New York, 1935), and J. Fred Rippy, The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931). The company has played a more enlightened role in the area as the result of recent pressures, but its mere size lends credence to the recent emotional outbursts against it by nationalistic leaders. Sydney Gruson, in an article in the New York Times "Review of the Week" section for July 4, 1954, reports its assets at $579,342,000, of which approximately 10 per cent was located in Guatemala.

40 The U.N. Charter provides (article 12) that the General Assembly may not make "any recommendation" regarding a dispute while the Security Council remains seized of it. But there is no analogous statement regarding regional organizations. The Charter states only (article 52, par. 3) "The Security Council shall encourage the . . . Pacific settlement of local disputes through . . . regional agencies. . . ." Article 53, par. 1 reinforces this. In the absence of definitive Charter statement on the matter, it seems quite indefinite. Norman J. Padelford in his "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting (1955), pp. 23–41, finds only the views of the Colombian delegate who was chairman of Committee III/4 of the U.N. Conference on International Organization at San Francisco (1945), as a basis for conjecture on this point. Padelford states that ". . . it would not have been incompatible with the accord reached at San Francisco if the Security Council had encouraged the parties to go to a regional organization and then had considered under Articles 33 or 34 a request to investigate whether a situation existed likely to disturb international peace and security." (His italics.) The Council was never seized of the Guatemalan issue. See U.N. Documents S/3253, June 28; S/3261, July 6; and S/3265, July 12, 1954.
tion to insure the enforcement of the resolution, and did not ask the O.A.S. to take action for several days. In the meantime, Guatemala, which on June 19 had asked immediate O.A.S. action (and was accorded a special meeting of the Inter-American Peace Committee within three hours after the delivery of the Guatemalan note), reversed its ground completely on the 20th and told the Peace Committee it would not cooperate with Committee action pending the outcome of the resolution of the Security Council of the 20th. This was in spite of the realization that that resolution was essentially meaningless from the viewpoint of terminating attacks on the Arbenz government. The sudden Guatemalan switch was explained on the nominal ground that Guatemala had never completed its ratification of the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the O.A.S. Charter, documents which provide the legal bases for action on behalf of the O.A.S. by the Peace Committee. The argument presented by the Guatemalan delegation was that the Peace Committee "... is only competent to deal with disputes between the Member States ..." This completely ignored the record of several years' action by Guatemala, which seemed to offer presumptive evidence that Guatemala considered itself a full member of the O.A.S. family of nations.

Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello and the Soviet representative combined to bring pressure on Security Council President Lodge for a second Council meeting on June 25. The fighting had continued, and Guatemala had not hesitated to level serious charges against its neighbors, although Castillo-Arriola, the Guatemalan representative, wrote anachronistically in a letter of June 23 that "... certainly Guatemala has no dispute of any kind with the neighboring States of Honduras and Nicaragua."

On June 19, the Guatemalan Chargé in Washington delivered a note to Luis Quintanilla, chairman of the Peace Committee, asking for an immediate meeting of the Committee for the purpose of taking action in regard to Castillo Armas' attack. The note alleged the intimate participation of Honduras and Nicaragua. Quintanilla further received a telephone call direct from Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello that midnight, asking that an investigating subcommittee leave for Guatemala on the 20th.

But on the afternoon of the 20th, the Chargé notified Quintanilla by telephone that the Guatemalan request was to be withdrawn, on the ground that the Security Council was considering the matter. This was later confirmed by several notes. See O.A.S., Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Paz sobre la Controversia entre Guatemala, Honduras, y Nicaragua, Document CIP-131/54, pp. 1–3. Full texts of the notes and other documents mentioned are contained in the appendix of this report.


The Peace Committee was extended and accorded a vote of confidence by resolution 102 of the Caracas (Tenth) Inter-American Conference. See Tenth Inter-American Conference (cited in note 13), pp. 101–2.


The Council meeting voted to take no direct action until it had the opportunity to receive a report from the Peace Committee. The Guatemalan government, which prior to the second Council meeting had rejected O.A.S. Peace Committee investigation, now reconsidered and announced it would welcome it. The date was the afternoon of June 26. After confirming the Guatemalan change of attitude, the Committee on the 27th determined that it would send a five-member team to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, starting the 28th.

At this juncture, it was announced that ten nations, including the United States, had requested a special meeting of the O.A.S. Council to consider the advisability of calling a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Rio Treaty under the terms of articles 6 and 11 of that treaty. The note had been presented to the O.A.S. Council chairman on June 26. Notwithstanding the June 27 resignation of Arbenz in favor of Enrique Díaz, the matter was pressed on the 28th by the United States. The meeting was voted unanimously, for Rio de Janeiro on July 7. The discussion was a lengthy one, and attitudes expressed by some Latin American representatives seem to indicate considerable reserve regarding the statement of United States representative Dreier which conveyed the thesis that had been maintained steadily by his government, that the Guatemalan matter could only be interpreted as an attack on the hemisphere by international communism.

It seems quite tenable to argue that the action was intended as a smoke-screen rather than as a sincere request. Dreier’s statement acknowledged that governmental changes were proceeding in Guatemala, but argued that it was yet too early to know if the new government would be free of the Communist taint. Certainly events between June 16, when it had been anticipated generally that the United States would ask such a convocation, and June 28, had not heightened the dangers of Communist profit in Guatemala. If anything, the position of Arbenz would seem to have weakened during this period. Surely there can have been no real suspicion that the government attacked by Castillo Armas could continue to govern Guatemala for any length of time. The question why the United States should have requested the investigation after the horse had fled the stable, rather than before, seems almost rhetorical under the circumstances. Investigation, or the proposal of a real study of the situation, prior to the outbreak of fighting, would have been sincere. The action of the 28th was only an empty gesture. Events, of course, proceeded in the direction of Arbenz’ ouster, and with the agreement of July 2 between Castillo Armas and Monzón, all rationale for the meeting disappeared.

The O.A.S. Council met in special session on July 2 to approve 18–1, with one abstention, the motion presented by Honduras and seconded by the United States that the July 7 meeting be postponed sine die. Perhaps the most mean-

47 Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Paz (cited in note 41), pp. 6–10.
49 Ibid., pp. 794–800.
ingful attitude taken in the discussion was that of Argentina. Its representative pointed out that while his country was as anti-Communist as any other, it was also concerned with armed intervention in the affairs of any other American nation, for whatever reason. Argentina further argued that the Guatemalan affair had in reality been only the beginning of such intervention, and as such deserved study. Further, in the light of the accusations against certain nations by the late Guatemalan government, the Argentine representative implied he would assume that they would welcome confirmation of the truth of their denials of complicity.49 It was not often that one found Perón’s Argentina thus on the side of the angels!

But the Argentine point was lost. And, of course, the inspection team of the Peace Committee did not reach its destination either. It was in Mexico City when the Castillo-Monzón negotiations opened, and it remained there. At the urgent request of the Monzón junta, it cancelled its trip at that point on July 2 and returned to Washington.50 The inaction of the U.N. Security Council and of the Inter-American Peace Committee (as agent for the O.A.S.) had combined with the successful operations of Castillo Armas to overthrow the Arbenz government.

V

The assignment of responsibility for the outcome to any single nation is difficult. The Arbenz government cannot be separated in our thinking from the role of martyr it voluntarily chose to assume. Had it not blocked Peace Committee intervention, it is possible—though not necessarily probable—that we would understand more clearly the maneuverings of both the United States and the Soviet Union. While it was conceivable in theory that the Peace Committee’s field investigations might have produced a resolution of the condition in favor of the Arbenz government, it does not necessarily follow that this would in fact have been the outcome. Comparison of the Guatemalan matter’s handling by the Peace Committee with the behavior of the O.A.S. Council in the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan dispute in January and February of 1955 seems inescapable. In the latter instance, the Council chairman was Dr. José Mora of Uruguay. His precedent-making action was responsible for immediate Council response to the Costa Rican complaint, and a cessation of hostilities in time to save the established Costa Rican government. This action in itself bears inspection for its implications for meaningful response by international organizations to threats to the peace of the world. It is of more than passing importance, however, to note that in this latter instance the United States accepted the lead of the Council, and that this acceptance made the Council’s action significant in the solution of the matter. It seems doubtful that the United States would have supported a similar Council request on behalf of the Arbenz regime.

50 Informe de la Comisión Intramericana de Paz (cited in note 41), pp. 10–14.
The Arbenz government, after first seeking help from the Inter-American Peace Committee, reversed its ground and decided to place its hopes in the U.N. Security Council. It is true that U.N. intervention has, in certain situations, been effective for the restoration of peace. It is also true that the Communist-controlled Arbenz government could receive the moral support of the Soviet Union in the U.N., while it could not in the O.A.S. It seems likely that this latter consideration was of greater significance in Guatemala’s decision to present its case to the Security Council than any possible conflict of interest or jurisdiction which might have arisen between the U.N. and the O.A.S. One may wistfully remark that it would be most interesting to see the correspondence, diplomatic or (probably) otherwise that must have passed between Guatemala City and Moscow’s agents on June 20, 1954, the day the Arbenz government decided to abandon its request for immediate O.A.S. action and turned completely to the U.N. Security Council.

But the international legal niceties of the jurisdictional question are not the focus of this paper, however interesting they may be. It seems sufficient to note that there has never been any definitive answer to the question: Does action by a regional organization preclude simultaneous remedial action by the United Nations? Closely linked to this question is another: Would not a decisive resolution of this question imply the relegation to political ineffectiveness of one or the other organization?

It is therefore significant that Guatemala chose to go to the Security Council. The Soviet Union, fulfilling expectations, vetoed a resolution calling for meaningful investigation by the O.A.S. The United States delegate denounced this Soviet action in heated words and rejected the alternative to O.A.S. action, the U.N. intervention asked by Guatemala.\footnote{Oliver, \textit{op. cit.} (note 29), observes cryptically, “... the sensitively attuned representatives of some of the other American republics must have felt [Lodge’s ‘emotional aside’] were reversions to the older, unilateral version of the Monroe Doctrine, to ‘manifest destiny,’ Senator Platt and all of that.” For the text of the Lodge statement see U.N., \textit{Document S/PV. 675}, paragraphs 164–172, and 223.}

While the United States has frequently posed as a defender of the United Nations, at least in its clashes with the Soviet Union, the United States was here placed in the unhappy position of questioning the sincerity of an appeal to the organization. Mr. Lodge’s dual position as United States delegate and Security Council President was productive of further embarrassment, for Guatemala’s numerous notes stating that the “bloodshed” had not ceased and that outside help was being given the Castillo Armas forces stated also what many did not doubt, that the entire matter was the product of United States support, indirectly if not directly. When, on June 22, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello wrote Lodge, as Council President, asking that the Council take steps to assure that the resolution of June 20 be made effective, Lodge replied:

... the Soviet Union ... has crudely made plain its desire to make as much trouble as possible in the Western Hemisphere. ... But the Government of Guatemala should not lend itself to this very obvious Communist plot, lest they should appear to be a cat’s
paw of the Soviet conspiracy to meddle in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, as it is, many persons will wonder whether the whole imbroglio in Guatemala was not cooked up precisely for the purpose of making Communist propaganda here in the United Nations. This I am sure Mr. Toriello would not want.22

The implication that even Castillo Armas was a part of the "whole imbroglio" is inescapable, and the sarcastic concluding sentence can only be described as tongue-in-cheek. The tone of the reply certainly states that a government which does not trust the impartiality of a regional organization's procedures—as Guatemala's leaders obviously did not, granted the predominant position of the United States in that organization—has no alternative but to use the regional procedure anyway. It can be argued correctly that the resolution calling for referral of the Guatemalan appeal to the Inter-American Peace Committee was introduced jointly by two Latin American nations and not by the United States. But events over a long period both before and after the meeting of June 20 indicate fully that Latin American nations are frequently ready to perform the United States' desires in order to avoid embarrassment to this country. The suspicion that this very thing was occurring on June 20 became valuable capital for Soviet and Guatemalan argumentation in the debate of that day.

Mr. Lodge continued in his reply to Guatemala's request for a second Council meeting, "... it has become increasingly plain that the situation in Guatemala is clearly a civil—and not an international—war ..." This seemed to fly in the face of all the evidence then available, and certainly caused serious doubts as to the good faith of the United States. But it was an attempt to offer a rationale for O.A.S., rather than U.N., action. Mr. Lodge's statements would not have been so devastatingly a denial of "due process" to Guatemala had he not been Security Council President. Mr. Lodge was placed by Guatemalan-Soviet tactics in the unfortunate dual position of defending politically the reputation of the United States while at the same time behaving correctly as President of the U.N. Security Council. In the latter capacity his functioning and impartiality were impaired by the feeling he apparently had that he must, as United States representative, denounce Guatemala as cynical because of its consistent request for U.N., as opposed to O.A.S., action. His choice of words can only be construed as gratuitous, since Guatemala's appeal to the U.N. was not improper under its position as a member only of the U.N. The Soviet veto of the Brazilian-Colombian resolution calling for inter-American Peace Committee jurisdiction over the civil war also was not improper, although it may well be viewed as cynical. In the Council debate of June 20, both the Soviet and Guatemalan delegates called repeated attention to articles 34, 35, and 52 (par. 4) as substantiation for their contention that the Security Council had both jurisdiction and responsibility. The failure of the Guatemalan delegate to secure the introduction of a resolution in the Council calling for U.N. rather than O.A.S. action may well have been a tactical device (dictated by the Soviet Union?) designed to condemn the United States by implication, rather than directly. If so, it did not fail of its purpose.

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If a case can be made that the Guatemalan affair was necessary by reason of unbearably imminent Communist danger, there is perhaps a rationale for the behavior of the United States. Secretary Dulles' statement of May 25 and address of June 30 made a serious effort to make such a case. But it must be argued that, if such danger existed, effective and impartial investigation would certainly have shown it, and would have eased the minds of many small nations in both Latin America and elsewhere. Since no investigation was permitted, by an ironic coincidence of United States and Soviet Union policy (the Arbenz government assisted in the development of this coincidence), the answer will forever hang on the statements of Mr. Dulles and the State Department. In terms of preserving its good reputation, the United States was in the position of having to make out a case for its actions. The Soviet Union, as so often happens, was not. One wonders if the United States would, in fact, have countenanced a full field investigation by an international body. In the absence of generally believable facts, conjecture runs riot. Guatemala's geographic position relative to the United States and to the Panama Canal renders rather unreasonable a statement that even a thoroughgoing Communist government could have been a substantial threat to the security of the United States, and the Mutual Security Treaties of April and May with Nicaragua and Honduras, respectively, served to put them beyond the immediate damage possible from irregular guerrilla troops operating on the basis of the famous 1,900-ton arms shipment. At the time of the shipment, numerous spokesmen for the United States government pointed out that Guatemala is but two hours' flight time from either the Panama Canal or the territorial United States, as modern jet aircraft fly. This is quite true, but such calculation is not equivalent to saying that jet aircraft do fly from Guatemala. The only airfield even scarcely suitable for such air operations, La Aurora at Guatemala City, is open to constant observation from the city itself by all who wish to look to see the planes taking off. Should such aircraft actually have begun to operate there, or should the government have expelled all suspect individuals (including, of course, United States citizens not excepting the United States Military Missions which remained there throughout the civil war), the United States would have had ample warning.

The shocked conscience of the world was probably represented best in the British House of Commons on July 14, 1954, by Clement Attlee, head of the Labor party, in foreign affairs debate:

The fact is that this was a plain act of aggression, and one cannot take one line on aggression in Asia and another line in Central America. I confess that I was rather shocked at the joy and approval of the American Secretary of State on the success of this putsch.

... we cannot pass this off as just a Central American squabble, of which there are so

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83 Ibid., pp. 30–34.
84a See the speech by Donald McK. Key, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, in United States Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 31, pp. 115–118 (July 26, 1954) for a most flagrant misrepresentation of the situation.
many. There was a principle involved and that principle was the responsibility of the United Nations. I think it was a mistake in these circumstances to try to hand over to a regional body. We might also have talk of handing over to a regional body in other parts of the world [China] and I do not think we would like the results very much. Therefore, I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems in some instances that the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of Communism.  

And William Frye, the Christian Science Monitor's United Nations writer, concludes:

The reputation of the United Nations as the primary resort of victims of aggression . . . has been beclouded. The Soviets, of all people, have been enabled to pose as the U.N.'s champion against attack by the United States . . . Here at U.N. headquarters, the United States' reputation as stout champion of collective security has been severely tarnished.  

Mr. Frye's conclusion makes reference to Sydney Gruson's observations regarding the Caracas anti-Communist resolution almost inescapable (see above, p. 792). It may well be that the United States, in late May and early June, 1954, had been able to present so persuasive a case to its fellow American Republics as to convince them that Guatemala presented a threat of subversion to them all. The comments of Arthur Krock of May 27, 1954, plus the arguments of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Dreier, indicate that such effort was made. Thus the State Department was aware of the views which were reported by Gruson. But the entire situation leads to the conclusion that the United States failed to give evidence of faith in the processes of the United Nations; that it dragged its feet regarding effective O.A.S. action beyond the point of reason; that it was intimately involved in a situation of subversion of a constitutional government; and that it did not at any time undertake to make the record clear to the people either of the United States or of Latin America. However justifiable the circumstances may have been, the United States has not allowed itself to be put in a complimentary light.

VI

Obviously none of this touches on the question of the qualities, democratic or undemocratic, of the Castillo Armas government which became the chosen instrument of the United States. Castillo was confronted with a well-nigh insurmountable problem of government. He found himself with a ruined treasury, a suspect bureaucracy, and a citizenry frightened and mutually suspicious. His career military training had little prepared him for his new role. Yet the consensus has been that he has done well with the raw materials at hand.

56 See Mr. Krock's column in the New York Times of that date.
Perhaps the intervention of the United States has come off better than we had any right to expect. 68

But the essential point of the experience has not been altered by the relative success of Castillo Armas. Rather, the entire experience seems to indicate the desirability of a stock-taking regarding United States foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America. From the date of the passage of the anti-Communist resolution at Caracas, Latin America, it has been shown, considered that the days of the Arbenz government were numbered. Few were surprised when the blow fell, although the precise manner and blunt nature of it had not been foreseen. Just after the start of the Guatemalan fighting, Joseph C. Harsch wrote:

... The only question seriously at issue is whether the United States can manipulate an operation of this kind skillfully and successfully... If there were no native revolutionary movement to encourage and support, then some other... remedy would have to be found. Fortunately, there was a bona fide native movement; and, fortunately, Honduras was willing to let it be launched from Honduran soil. 69

Harsch continues:

The best thing, of course, would be to prevent the establishment of communism in the first place. Unless and until more is done in the preventive line than has been done recently there will have to be more operations of this type. Economic aid in Latin America was one of the victims of the 1953 economy wave in Washington.

Mr. Harsch's contention is true, for our record with regard to our overall economic policies (not just economic aid) is far from satisfactory or consistent. 60

But even more urgently needed is some means of demonstrating, in forceful and pragmatic terms, the intimate connection between the security of the United States and that of the other nations of the hemisphere. This will not be accomplished by a contrived revision of history, nor by the imposition of North American standards of political morality on Latin Americans. Rather, it can be accomplished by punctilious compliance with both the spirit and letter of inter-American obligations, a vigorous effort to explain the United States viewpoint and nature to Latin Americans in such terms as will be understandable within their own frames of reference, and a conduct of economic relations such as to give evidence that this country is as concerned with the material advance of Latin America as it is with the advance of areas farther from our own borders.


60 Perhaps the most comprehensive and critical survey of recent United States economic policy toward Latin America is Simon G. Hanson's article, "The End of the Good-Neighbor Policy," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 7, pp. 3-49 (Autumn, 1953). Mr. Hanson's writing is very harsh, but his vigorous judgments make far too much sense to be ignored.